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FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES: THE DISAPPEARING
McCARRAN ACT EXEMPTION
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act (Mc-
Carran Act),' insurance companies have enjoyed a broad statutoryimmunity from certain federal laws. Although the McCarran Act
provides that no federal law shall impair any state law regulating the
business of insurance unless the federal law itself specifically relates to
the business of insurance,2 the Act does state that federal antitrust leg-
islation shall apply to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by state antitrust law.3  By restrictively inter-
preting these provisions, several recent decisions have rendered the
applicability of these exemptions less certain and have thereby resur-
rected the specter of pervasive federal insurance regulation.
In evaluating these developments, this Note will examine the
legislative history of the McCarran Act, the traditional exemption of in-
surance company activity from federal regulation, and the emerging
judicial qualification that applicable state laws must regulate the core
of the "business of insurance" in order to preclude federal jurisdic-
tion.4
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
2. The McCarran Act reads in pertinent part as follows:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act spe-
cifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the
Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State law. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
3. Id.
4. Another part of the McCarran Act that has given courts trouble is the question
of what is necessary to meet the requirement that the states "regulate" the business of
insurance. A plaintiff trying to defeat the application of the McCarran Act may allege
that the state's regulation is ineffective or that it does not provide remedies equivalent
to those available under federal law. This line of cases, which will not be included in
the scope of this Note, culminated in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451
F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
The continuing popularity of the McCarran Act with the insurance companies
may be accounted for, in part, by the fact that the existence of state legislation even
absent active enforcement is enough to disable federal laws that would in fact be en-
forced. Id. at 1184. Furthermore, it is not necessary for a state to provide plain-
tiffs with a treble-damage remedy in order to oust the Clayton Act. Transnational
Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26 (D. Ore. 1966).
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EXEMPTING THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE FROM
FEDERAL REGULATION
In 1944 the Supreme Court found the defendant insurance com-
panies in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association5
guilty of Sherman Act violations, thus upsetting the long-held judicial
belief that the business of insurance did not involve interstate com-
merce subject to federal regulation.6 Because the Supreme Court in
that case condemned both risk-rating and price-fixing groups,7 mem-
bers of the industry were fearful that the emergence of vigorous price
competition would threaten the financial stability of many compan-
ies.8 Since strictly enforced federal antitrust laws would frustrate the
industry's ability to pool loss statistics, 9 the insurance companies were
also concerned that individually they would not have enough data to
compute actuarially sound premium rates.10 In addition, the threat
of a federal regulatory scheme which would preempt state control of
the insurance business created a more immediate dilemma for the
insurance industry. The insurance companies were forced either to
pay state taxes and ignore the uncertainty as to the states' collection
authority, or else to ignore the states' demands for payment and run
the risk of losing their licenses to operate."
5. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
6. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
7. G. HEATH, INSURANCE WORDS AND THEm MEANINGs (8th ed. 1968) defines
an insurance rating bureau as "[ain organization which makes [premium] rates that
companies charge for their policies." Id. at 97. The rate is "[tihe price of $100 of
insurance usually for one year. Expressed in dollars and cents or in percent." Id.
8. This financial stability had often been achieved at the expense of the con-
sumer. During debate on the McCarran Act, Senator Pepper of Florida indicated that
between 1931 and 1940 the members of the South-Eastern Underwriters Association
had collected $89 million of net premiums from Florida but had only paid out $30
million in losses. 91 CONG. REc. 1479 (1945). Since the consumers of Florida were
potentially one of the direct beneficiaries of the Supreme Court decision, this factor
may provide an indication of why Senator Pepper was such a vocal opponent of the
dilution of that decision by the McCarran Act.
9. Senator Ferguson said that he thought that every state rate-fixing authority and
many state insurance laws violated both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 91 CONG. REc.
484 (1945), although he also discussed the reasons justifying rate-fixing by insurance
companies. Id. at 1481.
10. Insurance companies naturally preferred to be subjected to a less stringent state
antitrust scheme. Senator Pepper predicted: "As a practical matter, we know that
the States cannot and will not enforce these laws against these insurance companies."
91 CONG. Rac. 1444 (1945). But see Donza v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
74,545 (N.Y. Queens, Jan. 26, 1973) (an insured held to have a claim against an
insurance company for an illegal combination under state law); FoRBEs, Oct. 1, 1973, at
50 (general description of the resurgence of state antitrust enforcement).
11. 91 CONG. REc. 478-79 (1945) (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
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Under continuing pressure from a united insurance industry and
many state insurance commissioners, Congress finally adopted the Mc-
Carran Act, 2 which delivered to the states a clear mandate for their
continued regulation and taxation of the business of insurance. To
the claim that the Act was overly generous to the insurance interests,'3
the sponsors emphasized that this emergency measure was designed
only "to remove and dissipate that chaos [in the insurance world] by
enacting a law by which insurance companies will be able to abide for
the time being."' 4 If insurance companies later used their political in-
fluence at the state level to abuse this initially favorable treatment, a
future Congress could, the sponsors argued, invalidate any state laws
deemed violative of the spirit of the McCarran Act.'6 As no such re-
medial changes were ever forthcoming,'6 the temporary expedient has
ripened into two permanent exemptions from federal legislation.
Since almost all states have laws closely regulating the insurance in-
dustry, the first exemption authorized by the McCarran Act removes
the "business of insurance" from the scope of nearly all federal laws17
-- other than the Clayton, Sherman, and Federal Trade Commission
Acts-which do not specifically refer to the business of insurance.
Congress gave the industry this "blanket" exemption in recognition of
the difficulties inherent in formulating a comprehensive and lasting list
of the federal legislation to be made inapplicable to the insurance in-
dustry.' 8
12. Act of March 9, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33. Several earlier bills to
give the insurance industry relief had been introduced in the seventy-eighth session of
Congress. See S.1362, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1944). However, this session of Congress ended before either of these bills could
be enacted. For an informative discussion of the interaction of the insurance industry
groups and Congress before the McCarran Act was passed, see Note, A Year of S.E.U.A.,
23 Cm. KErr L. REv. 317 (1945).
13. Congressman Bailey, who had performed the duties of the state insurance com-
missioner in West Virginia, labeled the McCarran Act "the most selfish and most vicious
piece of proposed legislation . . . in the past decade ... " 91 CoNG. REc. 1091
(1945).
14. Id. at 484 (remarks of Senator Ferguson). See also id. at 1482-83 (remarks
of Senator Pepper).
15. Id. at 1481 (remarks of Senator Murdock).
16. SUBCOMM. ON ANTrIRUST AND MONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 83D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT CONCERNING THE TM-IN SALE or
CREDIT INsURANCE IN CONNECTON wrH SMALL LOANS AND OTHER FINANcIAL TRANs-
ACTIONS (Comm. Print 1955).
17. The McCarran Act has no effect on the applicability of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
15 U.S.C. § 1014 (1970).
18. Senator O'Mahoney said that this provision was included so that "it would
be a sort of catch-all provision to take into consideration other acts of Congress which
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The McCarran Act secondly exempts the business of insurance
from federal antitrust laws to the extent that the state involved has en-
acted similar legislation. This part of the bill was more controver-
sial.19 Senator Pepper, the most vocal opponent of the bill, did not
see why an insurance company should have "some sanctuary behind
some immunity by which it may fix prices, may squeeze out a com-
petitor, [or] may commit monopoly. ... "0 Under the provisions
of the Act, could not a state by its own regulation limit the extent, the
effect, and the applicability of the Sherman and Clayton Acts?2 In
response, Senator Ferguson conceded that if a state passed a law con-
trary to the federal antitrust laws, with the exception of a state law
authorizing intimidation, coercion, or boycott,22 "then the State law
would be the law."' 23  Senator McCarran later explained how this ex-
emption was supposed to work:
[Tihe United States attorney to whom such [antitrust] complaint
is made will then have to determine whether the particular practice com-
plained of is regulated by State law. If State regulation has been im-
posed-if the State has taken effective jurisdiction of the particular
practice in question-we can assume that the decision will be that the
federal antitrust laws do not apply.24
The exemption thus guaranteed that states could authorize the estab-
lishment of bureaus to fix insurance premium rates.2 5
might affect the insurance industry, but of which we did not have knowledge at the
time." 91 CoNo. RFC. 483 (1945).
19. During Senate debate, section 2(b) of S. 340, the predecessor of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b), was amended by its sponsors to except the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act from those federal laws that would not apply to the business of insurance unless
they specifically referred to it. 91 CoNG. RFc. 486-87 (1945). The bill, as enacted,
did not emerge until the House-Senate conference report, just three days before final
debate and passage in the Senate. Id. at 1488-89.
20. 91 CONG. REc. 1479 (1945).
21. Id. at 1481.
22. This refusal under the Sherman Act to allow intimidation, coercion, or boycott
in any form was preserved in section 3 of the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b)
(1970). Plaintiffs typically resort to this provision in an attempt to avoid application
of section 2 of the Act, id. § 1012(b), if section 2 prevents them from getting
federal jurisdiction under other sections of the Sherman Act. See California League of
Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal.
1959). See also Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co.,
163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958) (holding that since the antitrust exception referred
to the Sherman Act as it existed in 1945, insurance companies would be held liable in
boycott actions for treble damages, even though that part of the Sherman Act was re-
pealed before the date of the case).
23. 91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945).
24. McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium Under Public Law 15
Expired July 1, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 541 (1948).
25. 91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945).
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Despite the intended breadth of the exemptions, the McCarran
Act never absolutely immunized insurance companies from federal reg-
ulation. Even federal laws that did not specifically apply to the busi-
ness of insurance were enforced against insurance companies, thereby
circumventing the first exemption whenever (1) the federal statutes
could be construed in such a manner as to obviate any conflict with
state law,26 (2) the insurance company failed to demonstrate that the
state had actually regulated the specific matter in issue,27 or (3) an
insurance company claimed that the laws of its state of domicile
should be given extraterritorial effect.28
The insurance industry has achieved greater success in sidestep-
ping the application of federal antitrust laws. In those cases involv-
ing Sherman Act or Clayton Act claims against an insurance com-
pany, the courts consistently dismissed federal complaints upon a
showing that the appropriate state had regulatory legislation corre-
sponding, in function if not in remedy, to the federal legislation in
question. This early judicial approach to the antitrust exemption
was exemplified by Transnational Insurance Co. v. Rosenlund,20
wherein Transnational claimed that another insurance company and
Transnational's own former general agent30 had conspired to squeeze
it out of the insurance business. Stating that the purpose of the Mc-
Carran Act was to put the full weight of congressional power behind
the state schemes for regulating and taxing the business of insurance,
and without inquiring as to whether or not the alleged conspiracy
was part of the "business of insurance," the court construed the state's
legislation liberally so as to apply it to the defendant company's alleg-
26. See, e.g., United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 943 (1951) (indictment for federal mail fraud held not barred by the McCarran
Act because prevention of fraud not connected with the regulation of the insurance
business in Illinois). '
27. See, e.g., Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960) (defendant
failed to show that the federal Securities Act of 1933 invalidated any Texas law
regulating the insurance business).
28. See, e.g., FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960) (Nebraska held
not to have the power to regulate the out-of-state activities of a mail order insurance
company). See also In re Aviation Ins. Indus., 183 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(since many states did not attempt to regulate aircraft hull and casualty insurance, regu-
lation by the domiciliary state not given extraterritorial effect).
29. 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
30. A general agent may be defined as "an agent who supervises other agents,
sometimes called 'sub-agents.' In fire insurance, usually he has the exclusive franchise
for the company in a certain territory and does not solicit business direct [sic] from
the public. In casualty insurance, the term describes the form of commission contract
in effect between the company and the agent." G. HEATH, supra note 7, at 54.
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edly conspiratorial activities.31 Therefore, the federal antitrust law
was made inapplicable by the McCarran Act exemption.
THE "BusINEss OF INSURANCE": LIMITING THE
MCCARRAN ACT
During congressional debate, the term "business of insurance"
as it is used in the McCarran Act received scant consideration. How-
ever, it is possible to infer from the debate that the "business of insur-
ance" was intended to be synonymous with "insurance companies."
Senator Pepper argued that "we should not give insurance companies
immunity . . .,"; Senator Murdock stated, "Certainly the very pur-
pose of the bill. . . is to provide that state legislatures ... may relieve
insurance companies from contracts in restraint of trade. '33  Fur-
ther, Senator Barkley worried that state legislatures might attempt "to
put insurance companies within the State on an island of safety from
congressional regulation."3 4  In response to these criticisms, the
sponsors never declared that the bill only applied to particular activi-
ties of insurance companies. When Senator Pepper asked why the bill
did not specify which agreements by insurance companies should be
"legitimatized," Senator O'Mahoney responded, "I endeavored to
. . . induce the Committee of Congress to write into the law specific
exemptions from antitrust law, but I was unable to prevail,"3 again
implying that the term "business of insurance" included all insurance
company activities.
Like Congress, the courts initially assumed that there was no
distinction under the Act between "insurance companies" and the
"business of insurance." The only question that had to be answered
before application of the McCarran Act was simply whether or not
the defendant was an insurance company. The Supreme Court relied
upon this threshold inquiry in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Co.36 Failing to qualify under the McCarran Act as insurance
companies, the respondents in that case were ultimately subjected to
the federal securities laws. However, unlike that part of the decision
31. 261 F. Supp. at 28. The court even held that the state of Washington anti-
compact law should be construed broadly enough to include insurance contracts exe-
cuted in other states but performed in Washington. Id.
32. 91 CONG. Ruc. 1444 (1945) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1488 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 1444.
36. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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dealing with the question of insurance company status, 7 the Supreme
Court's holding that the term "business of insurance" must be defined
by federal courts as a matter of federal law88 has had lasting signifi-
cance. In his dissent, Justice Harlan admonished that the Variable
Annuity majority, by declaring the definition to be a matter of federal
law, failed "to take adequate account of the historic congressional
policy of leaving regulation of the business of insurance entirely to the
States."8 9  Nevertheless, several federal district courts immediately re-
stricted the applicability of the McCarran Act by distinguishing "busi-
ness of insurance" from other business activities undertaken by insur-
ance companies.
In United States v. Meade,40 a district court applied the Securities
Act of 1933 to interstate sale of the stock of a corporation set up to
operate a general insurance agency 41 and to perform other activities
including owning nearly all of the stock of an insurance company.
Since the conduct of the general insurance agency corporation was not
entirely devoted to insurance, it could not successfully claim the pro-
tection of the McCarran Act. The court observed that even the cor-
poration's investment in an insurance company did not enable it to
claim the exemption. In the court's view, "the investor in an insur-
ance company . . . [was not] in the classification of engaging in the
insurance business within the meaning of the McCarran Act.' '42
Years later, in Hill v. National Auto Glass Co.4 ' another federal dis-
trict court used a similar restrictive interpretation of "business of in-
surance," holding that the insurer's practice of placing the repair
business of its claimants with certain pre-selected glass installers did
not constitute "a part of the 'business of insurance' as that term is nor-
mally understood."44
It was not until 1969 that the Supreme Court in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.45 finally focused on how broadly the term "business
of insurance" should be construed.
37. The Supreme Court has since flatly precluded this threshold determinative in-
quiry. See SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969).
38. 359 U.S. at 69.
39. Id. at 96 (dissenting opinion).
40. 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
41. See note 30 supra.
42. 179 F. Supp. at 876.
43. 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
44. Id. at 296. After his motion to dismiss a count of the plaintiff's complaint
failed, the defendant again moved to dismiss in 1971. See text accompanying notes
74-78 infra.
45. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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SEC v. NATIONAL SEcURITIES, INC.
In the National Securities case, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) initially sought to enjoin the merger of an insurance
firm controlled by National Securities, Inc. and Producers Life, Inc. on
the ground that National Securities had mailed allegedly misleading
proxy solicitations in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193446 and rule 10b-547 thereunder. The Commis-
sion was denied temporary relief. Shortly thereafter while the
case was pending, the merger was consummated, whereupon the
SEC amended its complaint in order to seek a restoration of the
status quo ante and an accounting for the benefit of the shareholders
of Producers Life, Inc. 48
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint,49 the
Ninth Circuit determined that "[t]he State of Arizona [had] affir-
matively asserted its power to regulate the merger of insurance com-
panies." 50  It agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
SEC's requested invalidation of a corporate merger approved by the
Arizona Director of Insurance would impair the state law of Arizona.
Therefore, the application of the federal securities laws was prohibited
by the first exemption of the McCarran Act which protects state insur-
ance laws from impairment by federal laws that do not specifically
relate to the business of insurance.-1
The Supreme Court could have reversed the Ninth Circuit on the
narrow grounds that the interests of the shareholders were too inci-
dental to the business of insurance to qualify for the McCarran Act
exemption.52  Such a decision would have been unremarkable and in
line with previous interpretations of the term "business of insurance.""3
Instead, the Court promulgated a new, restrictive McCarran Act
standard, confining the "business of insurance" to the relationship
between insurer and insured, to questions surrounding the inter-
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
48. 393 U.S. at 455-56. See 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1024 (1969) for a
discussion of the McCarran Act aspects of the Supreme Court decision. For an analysis
of the securities law ramifications, see 20 SVRACUSE L. REv. 811 (1969); 47 TEX
L. REv. 1238 (1969).
49. 252 F. Supp. 623 (D. Ariz. 1966).
50. 387 F.2d 25, 31 (9th Cir. 1967).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
52. See text accompanying notes 40.44 supra. In Meade, the court said that the
alleged conduct of these defendants is remote from the business of insurance as in-
tended by the McCarran Act . . . ." 179 F. Supp. 868, 876 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
53. See 17 AM. U.L. REv. 554, 559 (1968).
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pretation and enforcement of insurance policies, and to other activi-
ties of insurance companies that relate closely to their reliability as in-
surers. i4 Thus, only state statutes aimed at protecting or regulating
the insurance relationship, directly or indirectly, were held to qualify
as laws regulating the business of insurance." The Court held that
the merger approval issued by the Arizona Insurance Commissioner
clearly failed to meet that test because "the State [had] focused its at-
tention on stockholder protection [and had not attempted] to secure
the interests of those purchasing insurance policies."" By virtue of
this decision, an insurance company is now entitled to a McCarran
Act exemption only when engaged in an activity which falls within
the Supreme Court's restrictive definition of the "business of insur-
ance."
Although it is doubtful in light of the legislative history that
Congress intended to distinguish between insurance companies and
the "business of insurance,"5" the result reached in National Securi-
ties parallels the curtailment of other federal law exemptions, such as
the narrowing of the federal antitrust immunity for activities under-
taken by a state.58  Moreover, an increasing number of lower court
decisions have enthusiastically embraced the spirit of the Supreme
Court's National Securities decision.
NATIONAL SECURITIES AND ITS PROGENY
Following National Securities, the cases arising under the Mc-
Carran Act may be divided into two classes corresponding to the two
principal operative clauses of the Act:59 (1) cases that rely on Nation-
al Securities to resolve a question of alleged impairment of state insur-
54. 393 U.S. at 460.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
58. This exemption originated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where
the Court held that a state-run raisin marketing program was not within the scope of
the Sherman Act. For the case law trend in this area, see 12 A.L.R. Fed. 329 (1972).
59. Several cases decided after National Securities (Jan. 1969) make no reference
to it. See Gerecht v. American Ins. Co., 344 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (inde-
pendent insurance agents alleged that insurance companies engaged in unreasonable re-
straint of interstate commerce); Sanborn v. Palm, 336 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1971)
(alleged tying arrangement between general insurance agent and his local agencies);
Holly Springs Funeral Home v. United Funeral Serv., 303 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Miss.
1969) (alleged unfair practices of burial insurance company against unaffiliated funeral
homes). Since none of these cases was concerned with the relationship of the in-
sured and the insurer, it is likely that reference to the holding of National Securities
would have made the McCarran Act inapplicable to these defendants.
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ance law by general federal legislation and (2) cases that use National
Securities to settle a question of federal jurisdiction under antitrust
laws.
Exemptions from Federal Laws That Do Not Specifically Relate to
the Business of Insurance
Whenever general federal legislation is alleged to be an encroach-
ment upon state interests as embodied in the state insurance laws,
the courts have paralleled the analysis in National Securities. In
Hart v. Orion Insurance Co.,60 for example, the application of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act"1 to the plaintiff's insurance policy might have
precluded an evidentiary hearing on the question as to whether a con-
tracted disease had affected the insured's fitness as a professional pilot.
For the McCarran Act exemption to prohibit the application of the
federal legislation, the insured had to show "that the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act invalidates, impairs, or supersedes a state law regulating the
business of insurance. '6 2  The plaintiff in Hart failed to make this
showing, as the Tenth Circuit held that the relevant state laws did not
specifically regulate the business of insurance, but rather applied gener-
ally to the methods of handling all contract disputes.6 3 Therefore,
even though the Federal Arbitration Act possibly conflicted with
state laws applicable to insurance companies, the federal law did not
impair a state law specifically regulating the business of insurance.
The result in this case is a good illustration of how National
Securities' mandate to examine what a state law is regulating can
reduce the potency of the exemption. 4 The Hart case demonstrates
that it is no longer sufficient that a general state law might be applicable
to the challenged aspect of the insurance business; the law must
specifically regulate the insurance relationship if the insurance com-
60. 453 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971).
61. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
62. 453 F.2d at 1360.
63. Id. This part of the court's opinion relied on Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Re-
public Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969). The Hamilton Life case was
argued four days before National Securities was handed down and was decided about a
month and a half later. In a dispute between insurance companies, the Hamilton Life
court, like the Hart court, held that state statutes regulating the method of handling
contract disputes generally were not laws regulating the business of insurance. Id.
at 611. Although the Hamilton circuit court did cite National Securities, there were
other valid grounds set out by the district court on which the court could have decided
the McCarran Act issue. See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
291 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
64. The court did not discuss this point in its opinion, but such a conclusion can
be inferred from the result reached.
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pany is to be successful in claiming the McCarran Act exemption from
federal regulation.
On the other hand, in Gerlach v. Allstate Insurance Co."; the
court exempted Allstate from the application of the Federal Truth
in Lending Act.6 The plaintiff had argued that this federal law
should be applied to force Allstate to disclose that the service charge
on its premium installment payments included an amount allocable to
interest.6 7 The court rejected this argument by concluding that the
service charge was part of the premium and that since the Supreme
Court had stated that the fixing of premium rates was a legitimate
aspect of the "business of insurance,"6 " the service charge was also
part of the business of insurance. Since Florida had legislation regulat-
ing the disclosure of premium financing terms,69 the application of the
Truth in Lending Act would have impaired the state enactment; and
therefore the federal legislation was barred by the McCarran Act.10
Though the regulation of premium installment terms may argu-
ably be closer to that core of the business of insurance, under the
Hart interpretation of the National Securities case, the court might
have decided that the Florida legislation applicable to the disclosure
of premium installment terms merely involved the regulation of fi-
nancing for all consumer transactions. That conclusion would have
obviated any conflict between a federal law and a state law regulat-
ing the business of insurance, and the McCarran Act exemption would
have been inapplicable. Such a result would be in accord with Na-
tional Securities' mandate to scrutinize the actual subject matter being
regulated under the guise of state insurance laws, but it would leave
only a very narrow area of "pure insurance" for the states to regu-
late.7T1
The Antitrust Exemption
The second group of cases subsequent to National Securities
65. 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970).
67. The court discussed the McCarran Act aspect of this case in order to provide an
alternative holding in case its conclusion that Allstate was not a creditor and, therefore,
not subject to the Truth in Lending Act was reversed. 338 F. Supp. at 649.
68. See SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. 627.839(3) (b) (1972) (former section 627.1003(3)(b) (1969)
was renumbered in 1972).
70. 338 F. Supp. at 649-51.
71. Since National Securities says that the McCarran Act protects state regulation of
the relationship between the insured and the insurer, it does not seem necessary to limit
this protection to only the activities that can be characterized as "pure insurance"
inasmuch as this relationship is a complex one encompassing noninsurance aspects.
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outlines the circumstances under which the McCarran Act exemption
precludes federal antitrust jurisdiction. As has previously been men-
tioned,72 the business of insurance is exempt from the federal antitrust
laws to the extent that similar state laws have been enacted. After it
has been determined that the claim falls under the federal antitrust
laws, the restrictive National Securities interpretation of the "business
of insurance" necessitates a factual analysis of the insurer's activity to
determine if it is part of the insurer-policyholder relationship, if it
involves the interpretation of an insurance policy, or if it relates
closely to the company's reliability as an insurer. If the activity
falls within this National Securities definition of the "business of in-
surance," the McCarran Act's antitrust exemption will be applicable
and the court then must examine the relationship between state and
federal antitrust regulation.
In several cases, the courts have been unable to find that the
insurer's activity bore the necessary relation to the business of insur-
ance. For example, despite an earlier rejection of a motion to
dismiss,74 the insurance company in Hill v; National Auto Glass Co.
again moved to dismiss the complaint after National Securities had
been decided. It will be recalled that Allstate Insurance Company
had contended that the McCarran Act immunized from federal anti-
trust liability its practice of sending claimants to selected glass install-
ers. 75  After a full review of the congressional debate on the McCar-
ran Act, the court concluded that, while the Act protected coopera-
tive activities between insurance companies, 8 "Congress at no time
indicated an intent to give insurance companies carte blanche to op-
erate in concert with non-insurance companies."'77  The McCarran
Act was narrowly construed so that the exclusive repair contracts
were held not to be part of the business of insurance" and thus
not exempt from federal antitrust jurisdiction.
The court in DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Insurance Co.79 also
utilized a factual analysis to determine that the activities complained
of were outside the scope of the business of insurance. The plaintiff,
an insurance agent, contracted to pay $1.25 per name for the customer
72. See note 2 supra & text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
74. 1971 TRADE CAS. 73,594 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (not reported in Federal Supple-
ment Reporter).
75. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
76. 1971 TRADE CAS. 173,594, at 90,459 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 354 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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list of a mortgage finance company with a view toward providing the
company with a mortgage protection life insurance plan for its bor-
rowing customers. After the mortgage company abrogated the agree-
ment by accepting another insurer's counteroffer, the plaintiff brought
a restraint of trade action under the Clayton Act. 0 As to the defen-
dant-insurer's claim of an exemption from federal antitrust regula-
tion, the court held that "[the defendant's business activity attacked
in the complaint is merely peripheral to the insurance business." '
Since the McCarran Act, as construed in National Securities, "did not
purport to make state legislation supreme in regulating all the activi-
ties of insurance companies,"2 the alleged conspiracy in restraint of
trade was clearly subject to the sanctions imposed by the Clayton Act.'
The third case where the courts declined to find a McCarran
Act antitrust exemption, Fry v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,8 4 represents a more questionable extension of National Securities.
In this class action the insurance company allegedly violated federal
antitrust laws (1) by tying the purchase of life insurance and irriga-
tion equipment to the making of interstate farm loans and (2) by
using excessive loan valuations and high interest rates for the conspira-
torial purpose of later foreclosing on the property. Unlike the courts
in the two preceding cases, the Fry court did not attempt to rely on a
factual analysis to relate the alleged unlawful activity to the business
of insurance. Instead, the court ignored the antitrust exemption alto-
gether and interpreted the seemingly inapplicable "general" McCarran
Act exemption which the Supreme Court in National Securities had
so carefully examined. 5 Under this approach, the applicable state
statute, one regulating the antitrust aspects of insurance company
80. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
81. 354 F. Supp. 876-77.
82. Id. at 877.
83. Nonetheless, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted be-
cause the plaintiff had been unable to establish the necessary interstate activity or to
prove the existence of an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 878.
84. 355 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
85. See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text. Having lost on the claim of a
McCarran Act exemption, the defendant may have a difficult time escaping liability if
the case is tried on the merits. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969), makes it clear that when deciding restraint of trade actions,
predit will not be treated differently in principle from other goods and services.
In this case the plaintiff had to buy prefabricated homes as a condition of being
allowed to purchase the tying product-credit. The Fortner decision would seem to
undercut the vitality of United States v. Investors Diversified Serv., 102 F. Supp. 645
(D. Minn. 1951), which held that there was no violation of the Clayton Act where
the defendant tied the selling of insurance on the mortgaged property to the making of
mortgage loans because money was not a commodity as that term is used in the Clayton
Act.
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lending, was held to be no more closely related to the "business of insur-
ance" than the National Securities statute, which required extensive
disclosure pursuant to insurance company mergers. The court ex-
plained that both of these state statutes were inappropriate to sup-
port a McCarran Act exemption because "[n]either type of statute
attempts to regulate activities which center upon the relationship
between the insurance company and the policyholder .... "86 The
Fry court thus denominated the state statute an antitrust rather than
an insurance regulation. 87  Then the court summarily rejected the in-
surance company's contention that the McCarran Act specifically pro-
vided that state antitrust regulation supersedes the federal laws, by
saying that the court had already determined that the activities com-
plained of were not part of the business of insurance. 8  Thus, under
this rationale, a state antitrust statute by its very nature could never
pass the threshold qualification as a state statute regulating the "busi-
ness of insurance."
The opinion neglects to explain this abrupt conclusion. It is pos-
sible that the court thought that its discussion of how the state
laws regulated antitrust matters instead of the business of insurance
was sufficient. If this interpretation of the opinion is correct, the
court's approach was entirely inappropriate. The court's inquiry into
the subject matter of a state law that has been characterized as insur-
ance regulation belongs in a case involving the first McCarran Act
exemption; that exemption protects state laws which regulate the busi-
ness of insurance from impairment by federal laws that do not specific-
ally relate to the business of insurance. However, in the Fry case the
only issue was the applicability of federal antitrust laws. To be entitled
to the McCarran Act exemption from those laws, the litigant must
prove that the state has corresponding antitrust legislation. Because it
misapplied National Securities, the court in Fry ruled out any possibility
that the defendant insurance company might prove that the state had
enacted the antitrust regulation required by the McCarran Act ex-
emption. The apparent reasoning of the court would seem to have
the effect of completely nullifying the antitrust exemption of the Mc-
Carran Act. 9
86. 355 F. Supp. at 1153.
87. The court explained:
[I]t is clear that any state statutes purporting to regulate the antitrust aspects
of insurance company lending (aside possibly from loans to policyholders to
finance premiums) would be antitrust regulation rather than insurance regu-
lation. Id.
88. Id. at 1154.
89. The implication of the Fry decision (that antitrust laws and laws regulating
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If the court had made a factual analysis of the lending activity,
it might have considered that, while credit insurance was necessary
for the lender's reliability, it did not follow that the insurance pur-
chased by the borrower necessarily had to be sold by the same lender.
On the other hand, the court could have easily concluded that the
required purchase of life insurance was related to the security of the
loans. Since the ability of an insurer to collect its loans would influence
its reliability as an insurer, the company might have argued that the
activity should be included within National Securities' definition of the
"business of insurance." This position would be consistent with the
several cases that have upheld McCarran Act exemptions on the
grounds that the activities complained of were related to the reliability
an insurer.90
The cases that have focused on the insurer's reliability as a
basis for upholding the McCarran Act antitrust exemption are in-
structive in showing how an activity can be fitted within the restric-
tive National Securities' definition of the term "business of insurance."
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross,91 a hospital contract that
allowed Blue Cross to pay lower hospital rates on behalf of its in-
sureds was subjected to a federal antitrust attack.92 The court upheld
the contract, applying the McCarran Act antitrust exemption on the
strength of the close relationship of the hospital contract to Blue
Cross' reliability as an insurer.93 In Commander Leasing Co. v.
the, business of insurance are mutually exclusive sets) is contradicted by the very
wording of the antitrust exemption. Since the McCarran Act says that the federal
antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law," 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970), the Act
clearly contemplates many situations where the two conditions will coexist. See' note
2 supra.
Because Fry was only an opinion on a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint,
it is too early to conclude that it will have much effect on judicial interpretatioi of
the McCarran Act. It might be noted, however, that the district court recognized that
its decision involved "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion." 355 F. Supp. at 1155. Accordingly, the court granted
the parties the right to seek an immediate appeal from its order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1970). Id. On April 25, 1973, however, the Fifth Circuit declined the
opportunity to hear this appeal. Telephone conversation with the Clerk of Court, 5th
Cir., June 21, 1973.
90. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973); Com-
mander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973).
91. 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (Dec. 11, 1973)
(No. 73-602).
92. Id. at 82. One of the grounds of the appeal was that general state supervision
of insurance activities is not enough to activate the McCarran Act exemption.
93. The other part of the holding was that "the interrelationship of hospital pay-
ments and subscribers' rates was such that Blue Cross' arrangement with hospitals
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Transamerica Title Insurance Co.,94 the court used a similar rationale
in holding that the examination of real estate titles in preparation for
the issuance of title insurance was so closely related to the defendant's
reliability as an insurer that the McCarran Act antitrust exemption
should apply.95
In the future the test of whether an activity is related to the
reliability of an insurer may become a common means of circum-
venting the restrictive effect of the National Securities decision. Nearly
every activity that reduces risk or improves the financial condition of
an insurance company can arguably be related to its reliability as an
insurer. Although it will be difficult to distinguish the degree to
which various activities affect reliability, the restrictiveness of the Mc-
Carran Act antitrust exemption as interpreted in National Securities
might still be preserved. The Court might, for example, establish a
stringent "but for" test that would require the insurance company to
show that but for the activity complained of, the financial stability of
the company would be substantially and immediately affected.
CONCLUSION
Since the current political climate apparently favors business regula-
tion,90 Congress is unlikely to set aside the restrictive National Securi-
ties judicial interpretation of the term "business of insurance." Nor
is it likely that the courts will reach a speedy resolution of the exist-
ing confusion because the definition of that term is a federal question
that must await the gradual development of federal common law.
Thus far the judicial. interpretations have generally improved a
plaintiff's chances of bringing an action against an insurance company
under federal law. Insurance companies will be particularly vulner-
able to treble-damage actions against several prevalent industry
practices. Plaintiffs most likely will challenge the practice of condi-
should be considered part of the 'business of insurance.'" Id. at 83. (The Third
Circuit was reciting the district court's conclusion with approval).
94. 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 83. For the $5,000 title insurance policy involved in this case, the
insurance premium was only $14, while the service charge for title examination was $61.
This split of income suggests that the sale of insurance was only incidental to the pri-
mary activity of title examination. Using the rationale of United States v. Meade,
179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960), the court could have said that a substantial part of
the company's activity in the case was not devoted to insurance and therefore was out-
side the scope of the McCarran Act. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
96. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651 et
seq. (Supp. 1973); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et
seq. (1970).
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tioning a loan on the purchase of insurance from the lender. 7  A
variation of this theme confronted the Fry court. A second type of
case would involve a restraint of trade action brought by a group of
independent insurance agents against an insurance company.0 8 Be-
cause of the successful market penetration of companies like Allstate
Insurance that sell to retail customers through company employees,
the companies using independent agents have already been forced to
make some adjustments, such as the reduction of commissions, that
have led to discord with the independent agents. Because of the re-
strictive interpretation of the term "business of insurance," insurance
companies can expect that they will now have to litigate many federal
cases that previously could have been dismissed on the strength of
the McCarran Act exemption. Moreover, with the revitalization of
state antitrust regulation,99 the insurance industry may become in-
creasingly less eager to escape federal jurisdiction of antitrust claims
against them. Uniform regulation of the national insurance business
may ironically become a more attractive alternative than the strict en-
forcement of a variety of state antitrust schemes.
97. Insofar as consumer loans are concerned, this practice is no longer legal in the
states that have adopted section 4.109 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. See Davis,
Etter, Blythe & Freund, The Regulation of Consumer Credit Insurance, 33 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 718, 727 (1968).
98. See, etg., Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Aetna Life & -Cas. Co., 345
F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (alleged "illegal coercion, illegal intimidation, illegal
restraint of trade, all of which are in violation of the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act"); Gerecht v. American Ins. Co., 344 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D.
Mo. 1971) (alleged violation of Sherman Act in conspiring to eliminate competition
in sale of insurance and the employment of independent agents); California League of
Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal.
1959) (alleged conspiracy to restrain trade by companies' agreement to decrease rate
of commission paid to automobile insurance agents).
99. See note 10 supra.
[Vol. 1973:13401356
